

Perceptions of Prolonged Occupation as Barriers to Conflict Resolution

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The goal of this research was to examine whether a denial of a prolonged occupation by the occupying society constitutes a meaningful sociopsychological barrier to resolving the conflict peacefully. We hypothesized that this perception will be associated with objections both to conflict resolution processes and to specific compromises intended to end the occupation. Furthermore, we hypothesized that the association between denial of the occupation and compromises will be partially mediated by denial of its costs, low levels of moral emotions, and closure to new information about the conflict. Taking the prolonged Israeli occupation as our case study, we used three nationwide representative polls of Jewish Israelis to test our hypotheses. The studies supported our hypotheses, pointing to the distinct role that the perception of prolonged occupation by the occupying society plays in peacefully ending this situation, and the psychological mechanisms underlying occupation denial as a barrier to conflict resolution.

KEY WORDS: occupation, denial, barriers, conflict resolution, Israeli-Palestinian conflict

At the heart of some of the most violent and protracted ethnic conflicts around the world lies prolonged occupation unwanted by the occupied society. Examples include the occupation of Chechens by Russians, of Tibetans by Chinese, and of Palestinians by Israelis. Prolonged occupation is unique in the realm of territorial occupation following an armed conflict, referred to in legal literature as belligerent occupation (see Benvenisty, 1993; Dinstein, 2009; Edelstein, 2004; Roberts, 1990). Long-lasting occupation of this type almost always involves claims by the occupying society, which often views the occupied territory as its own. In these cases, not only is there controversy about legitimate sovereignty over the occupied territory, but also domination and oppression of the occupied society. As history shows, the occupied society does not abandon its aspirations for self-determination despite the suffering and lost rebellions, and therefore the prolonged occupation deepens animosity and resentment, as well as feeds cycles of violence (see examples of Irish, Poles, Hungarians, Algerians, Chechens, or Koreans). Therefore, ending the occupation by mutual agreement regarding the status of

the occupied territory and satisfying the needs of members of both societies are necessary in order to resolve the conflict peacefully.

In this article, we suggest that denial of the occupation by the occupying society, justified with different rationales, constitutes a meaningful sociopsychological barrier to resolving the conflict peacefully. This is so because often the occupying society constructs a major epistemic basis for continuing to hold the territory, refusing to admit occupation (see Halperin, Bar-Tal, Sharvit, Rosler, & Raviv, 2010). It refuses to leave the territory even though the occupied society has valid contentions, accepted by at least part of the international community, or sees the withdrawal as a major sacrifice that must be well compensated.

The recent work of Bar-Tal, Halperin, and colleagues elaborates on the cognitive, motivational, and emotional mechanisms constituting sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution (Bar-Tal, 2013; Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2009) and their effects on conflict-related attitudes (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Porat, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2015). We maintain that the denial of the occupation is an example of such a barrier. It creates obstacles to the peace process generally, as well as to proposed solutions for conflict resolution involving ending the occupation. In the present article, we examine the implications of the occupiers' denial of the occupation, using empirical studies conducted among Israeli Jews in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and prolonged Israeli occupation. To clarify our premise, we first detail the definition and implications of prolonged occupation and possible justifications for it among the occupiers. Next, we delineate the consequent view of the occupation by the occupying society and its relationship to attitudes towards possibly ending the conflict peacefully.

Prolonged Occupation: Its Characteristics and Implications

The legal definition of occupation relates to an "effective control of a certain power (be it one or several states or an international organization), over a territory which is not under the formal sovereignty of that entity, without the volition of the actual sovereigns of that territory" (Benvenisty, 1993, p. 4). The state of prolonged occupation is a special case, which lasts more than five years, continuing even when military hostilities subside or cease (Roberts, 1990). The definition of prolonged occupation used in the current article therefore indicates its exceptional timeframe, as well as the undermining of its original military and legal justifications.

Prolonged occupation has pervasive social implications. In the present international arena, the term bears negative sociopsychological connotations: It indicates an inherent conflict of interest between occupier and occupied and a context characterized by violence; it reflects wrongdoing, injustice, and immorality; it involves deep empathy toward the occupied and negativity towards the occupier, and finally it conveys an expectation that the situation is temporary and will be terminated (Bar-Tal & Schnell, 2013a; Rosler, Bar-Tal, Halperin, Sharvit, & Raviv, 2009).

The negative implications of prolonged occupation confront the occupiers with challenges to their positive collective identity (see Halperin et al., 2010). These connotations are even further amplified because of violations both of shared basic moral principles inherent in prolonged occupation and of codes and laws that guide the international community (see Rosler et al., 2009). Members of the occupying group often find themselves using force, and at times performing oppressive acts that contravene fundamental prevalent moral norms and international laws, because the occupied society usually resists occupation in different nonviolent and violent ways (Bornstein, 2008; Kaufman, 2013; Kretzmer, 2013).

Occupying societies must cope psychologically and socially with these sociopsychological challenges to maintaining an adaptive state and satisfying individual and collective needs of preserving positive self-collective view. In addition, they must deal with various international organizations responsible for monitoring human rights violations and pressures and even boycotts by the international community. These pressures may undermine social order and economic stability, generating high economic, political, moral, military, psychological, and social costs and delegitimizing the

occupying government (Bar-Tal & Schnell, 2013b). We need to note, though, that there are not only costs for the occupying societies. They also benefit in different ways such as by settling the occupied land, using its natural resources, taking economic advantage of the situation and so on (Scobbie, 2011; Zertal & Eldar, 2007).

Past research has suggested insights into psychological, social, and political mechanisms that individuals and societies utilize in order to deal with their group's wrongdoing. Moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) has been found to help members of a perpetrator group cope with their group's misdeeds by legitimizing the act (Coman, Stone, Castano, & Hirst, 2014), denying their group's responsibility (Bilali, 2013), assigning blame to or dehumanizing the victimized group (Castano & Giner-Sorolla, 2006), using euphemistic labeling (Gavriely-Nuri, 2010), or minimizing negative consequences (Leidner, Castano, Zaiser, & Giner-Sorolla, 2010). Other mechanisms include motivated "forgetting" (Rotella & Richeson, 2013) and social silencing of wrongdoing (Nets-Zehngut, Pliskin, & Bar-Tal, 2015). These mechanisms help group members to maintain collective positive self-image and reduce unpleasant moral emotions (Lickel, Steele, & Schmader, 2011; Sullivan, Landau, Branscombe, & Rothschild, 2012; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008).

However, no previous study explicitly examined denial of the ingroup's wrongdoing by refusing to acknowledge and label its actions as such. Billali (2013) who conducted the only empirical study as far as we know that specifically examined denial of the ingroup's misdeeds, measured willingness to take responsibility for these actions but not their perception as morally questionable, using negative political labels (e.g., genocide). The present research aims at investigating a situation of *ongoing prolonged occupation*, namely the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories and its acknowledgment or denial as such by group members. We suggest that the denial of the state of occupation, serving as a barrier to peaceful conflict resolution, is associated with objection both to conflict-resolution processes and to specific compromises. This relationship is mediated by disregard of the social and moral costs of the occupation and low levels of moral emotions.

The psychological and material burdens can end when the occupation is terminated. Acknowledging the situation as an occupation without overlooking its negative implications could therefore be a key to ending it. But apparently, in prolonged occupation, the occupying society uses sociopsychological mechanisms that allow it to ignore reality and to construct a well-grounded justification for maintaining the occupation.

Two major sets of nonmutually exclusive arguments justifying the occupation may be observed: ideological justifications and pragmatic justifications. Ideological justifications include perception of the occupied territory as part of the occupiers' homeland and therefore defining it as "liberated" territory or "reunification" (e.g., the occupation of Tibet by China). In addition, the occupation can be ideologically justified as serving other moral, religious, or cultural imperatives and goals, such as protecting rights of a closely related social group (e.g., the occupation of Southern Ossetia by Russia). Pragmatic justifications, on the other hand, may include perception of the occupation as necessary to ensure secure existence for the occupying society, preventing future military invasions, terror attacks, or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, or creating military deterrence and defensible borders (e.g., the occupation of Iraq by the United States). The occupied territory can be viewed on those grounds as an important strategic and political stronghold for the occupiers, otherwise tempering their internal stability or international status (e.g., the reoccupation of Chechnya by Russia during the 1990s). Moreover, potential withdrawal from the occupied territory can be pragmatically seen as bringing about great material losses to the occupiers because of economic benefits or because of their large investments, either in maintaining the occupation or in settling their own population in the territory (e.g., the Japanese occupation of Manchuria).

Since political rhetoric allows leaders to design persuasive arguments to influence the society members (Chong & Druckman, 2007; Condor, Tileagă, & Billig, 2013), they may use the above-

noted justifications as a rationale to mobilize society members to maintain the occupation and at the same time shape their identity (cf., Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011; Hogg, 2007; Rosler, 2016). This can be done by appealing to collective memory, national and religious tradition, ingroup loyalty, emphasizing common norms and values, as well as desired goals and interests (Haslam et al., 2011; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001; Snow & Benford, 1988).

The various justifications for continuing the occupation can be seen more generally as *conflict-supporting beliefs*. These are underlying forces inhibiting progress towards a peaceful resolution of the situation (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2009). Empirical studies examining the functioning of these forces, termed “sociopsychological barriers” to conflict resolution (cf. Ross & Ward, 1995), have pointed to their impact over information processing and conciliatory attitudes. Thus, for example, conflict-supporting beliefs delegitimizing the opponent or seeing the ingroup as the ultimate victim were found to be negatively related to levels of support for compromises, both directly and mediated by openness to new alternative information (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). In another study, adherence to societal beliefs supporting the conflict (e.g., justness of one’s own goals, security, victimization, and delegitimizing the opponent) was found to generate a decrease in the general amount of information viewed by participants regarding a new peace proposal, low openness to new information supporting the peace process, and eventually, greater rejection of the peace proposal (Porat et al., 2015). Previous research dealing with societal beliefs pertaining to security threats to the occupying society pointed to their effect on conciliatory attitudes regarding peaceful conflict resolution and ending the occupation (Gordon & Arian, 2001; Maoz & McCauley, 2009). Still other studies found that dehumanization of the occupied society resulted in support for aggressive retaliatory policies towards its members (Maoz & McCauley, 2008).

In sum, substantial empirical evidence highlights the powerful impact of conflict-supporting beliefs on the way that members of societies involved in intractable conflicts process information and form specific positions about peacemaking (see Bar-Tal, 2013). However, none of these studies has dealt with the relationship of beliefs pertaining to prolonged occupation in the framework of an ongoing conflict to occupying society members’ support for peaceful conflict resolution by ending the occupation. The current research addresses this gap and explores the relationship of perceptions of occupation to conciliatory political attitudes.

To conclude, we have suggested several psychological processes through which denying an occupation may have serious political implications, reducing the normative motivation for change, or amplifying the effect of other psychological barriers. Therefore, we hypothesize:

H1: Perceptions denying an occupation will be associated with objection to conflict resolution and to specific compromises intended to end the occupation.

Referring to the mechanism behind the proposed association, we hypothesize that

H2: Denying the social costs of the occupation to the occupying society, as well as low levels of moral emotions, will mediate the relationship between denial of occupation and rejecting compromises aimed at ending it.

Furthermore, similar to the impact of other barriers on the processing of new information (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Porat et al., 2015), we hypothesize that

H3: Denial of an occupation will reduce openness to new information about the occupied group’s perspective on the conflict, thus decreasing support for compromises.

The Present Research

The research examined the proposed hypotheses in the context of the Israeli occupation of Palestinian territories, which serves as typical intractable ethnic conflict intertwined with a prototypical example of a protracted occupation. Israel gained control of the Palestinian-populated territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the 1967 war and fully controlled them until 1993. Since then, it has retained different levels of control, depending on the political and legal definition of the area in the 1990s Oslo Accords. The conquest of the territories almost immediately and dramatically increased the view among Israeli Jews that they had been liberated because they were part of the promised historical Jewish homeland.

This idea eventually became hegemonic among the dominant sectors of Israeli Jews (Arian, 1995; Magal, Oren, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2013; Naor, 2001). An accompanying conviction also emerged that Israel could not withdraw from the occupied territories because of the need to secure its eastern border (Oren, 2005). Since the initiation of the peace process with the Palestinians in the early 1990s, the views of Israeli Jews have become more pragmatic regarding political compromises. Yet still many consider the conquest of the West Bank as liberation. In the present research, we investigated the relationship of perception of Israel's control of the West Bank as occupation among Jewish Israelis to their attitudes towards ending it in the conflict-resolution process.

We used three public opinion surveys to test our hypotheses. The first one is from the database of the Peace Index project, conducted by the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research at Tel-Aviv University between 1994 and 2010.¹ The project involves polls conducted monthly among a random probability sample representing the adult Jewish population in Israel. Study 1a is based on such a monthly poll that was conducted in August 2004, which also included a question regarding the willingness to acknowledge Israel's control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an occupation. Study 1b was a telephone survey conducted by the National Security Studies Center (NSSC) at the University of Haifa in April 2007, to which we were given the opportunity to add questions in order to replicate the findings from the previous poll, and to further examine our first set of hypotheses by asking about specific compromises.² In Study 2, we report a very recent nationwide poll among Jewish Israelis initiated by the authors to examine the second set of hypotheses, that is, the psychological mechanism behind the association that was found in the previous polls between denial of the occupation and rejection of compromises.

STUDY 1a

Studies 1a and 1b examined our hypotheses regarding relations between perception of the situation as an occupation and support for peaceful conflict resolution. The poll used in Study 1a measured the extent to which Jewish-Israelis perceived Israel's control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an occupation. It also measured participants' levels of general support for peace, as well as other relevant sociodemographic variables. We hypothesized that acknowledging the situation as an occupation would predict support for peace beyond the effect of sociodemographic predictors.

Sample

The sample included 498 Jewish Israeli respondents (248 men and 250 women), constituting a random probability sample of the adult Jewish population of Israel. Ages ranged from 18 to 89 years old with a mean of 46.6 ($SD = 17.2$). The distribution of other sociodemographic characteristics resembled that of the adult Jewish population of Israel (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2004). Politically, 39% reported voting for parties on the political right (e.g., Likud) in the last elections, 11% reported voting for parties in the political center (e.g., Shinuy), 19% reported voting for parties on the political

¹ Since 2010, the Peace Index Project has been administered by The Evens Program in Mediation and Conflict Resolution at Tel Aviv University and The Israel Democracy Institute. For more information, see <http://www.peaceindex.org/DefaultEng.aspx>

² This study included additional items used for other purposes.

left (e.g., Labor), 6% reported voting for ultra-Orthodox parties, 1% reported voting for other parties, and 24% reported not voting or refused to respond.³

Measures

General Support for Peace

Previous studies found that items indicating support for the peace process and items probing the belief that the peace process would lead to a peace agreement were highly and consistently correlated with each other over a long period of time (Hermann & Yuchtman-Yaar, 2002). Accordingly, four items ($\alpha = .84$) were used to create an index of general support for peace, two of which referred to support for a peace process with the Palestinians and two referred to the belief that the process will lead to actual peace. The complete wording of the items can be found in Appendix S1 of the online supporting information. Because the responses to different items were given on different scales, the composite index was computed as the sum of the scores.

Acknowledging the Occupation

Respondents' willingness to acknowledge that Israel's control of the West Bank and Gaza Strip constitutes an occupation was assessed using one item: "According to your worldview, are the territories, meaning the West Bank and Gaza Strip, occupied territories, or are they not occupied territories?" (1 = certain that they are not occupied; 4 = certain that they are occupied).

Sociodemographic Variables

The following sociodemographic variables were included in the analysis: gender, age, marital status, having children, education level, religiosity, being born in Israel, immigration from the former USSR, household income relative to the national average, and voting in the last elections.

Results

Acknowledging the Occupation

In 2004, 51% of the respondents indicated that they were certain or thought that the West Bank and Gaza Strip were occupied territories, while only 39% were certain or thought that they were not occupied territories (10% did not respond). The complete distribution of responses can be found in Appendix S2 of the online supporting information.

Predicting Acknowledgment of the Occupation

Spearman's correlations among all the variables are presented in Appendix S3 of the online supporting information. Acknowledgment of the occupation was strongly and positively correlated with leftist voting ($r = .45, p < .001$) and positively but less strongly correlated with household income ($r = .13, p = .007$). In addition, it was negatively correlated with religiosity ($r = -.19, p < .001$) and with being an immigrant from the former USSR ($r = -.18, p < .001$). To test which sociodemographic variables uniquely predicted acknowledgment of the occupation beyond all others, we first recoded the responses into a dichotomous variable (1 = certain or think that the territories are occupied; 0 = certain or think that they are not occupied). Then we conducted logistic regression with this variable as the criterion and the sociodemographic variables as predictors (entered simultaneously). Dummy variables were created for categorical predictors.

The overall model was significant (Cox and Snell $R^2 = .23, \chi^2(25) = 100.48, p < .001$). Acknowledgment of the occupation was positively related to voting for the Labor party in the last elections, and negatively related to voting for the ultra-orthodox party Yahadut Hatorah and to being an immigrant from the former USSR. None of the other predictors had significant effects (see Table 1).

³ Political left or right in the Israeli context mostly refers to the continuum between hawkish and dovish views regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This ideological orientation is associated with differential support for various political and social policies (see Sharvit, Bar-Tal, Raviv, Raviv, & Gurevich, 2010).

Table 1. Logistic Regression Predicting Acknowledgment of the Occupation by Sociodemographic Variables (Study 1a)

	B	SE	Wald	Exp(B)
Gender (1 = male, 0 = female)	-.25	.25	1.06	.78
Age	-.01	.01	.27	1.00
Education				
Partial high school	-.27	.73	.14	.76
High school	-.25	.62	.17	.78
Post high school	-.24	.70	.12	.78
Academic	-.51	.66	.59	.60
Voting in Last Elections				
Labor	1.77	.50	12.75	5.89**
Likud	-.32	.32	1.04	.72
Shas	-.67	.85	.63	.51
Meretz	21.02	9165.68	< .001	> 10 ⁹
Mafdal	-.04	.73	.003	.96
Yahadut Hatorah	-2.15	1.00	4.61	.12*
Am Echad	-21.62	40192.97	< .001	< .001
Shinuy	.55	.44	1.55	1.73
HaIchud HaLeumi	-.86	.86	1.01	.42
Israel BaAliya	2.14	1.26	2.88	8.47
Other	.34	.90	.14	1.41
Religiosity				
Traditional	.07	.29	.06	1.07
Religious	-.69	.48	2.01	.50
Orthodox	.46	.80	.34	1.59
Household Income	.07	.10	.51	1.07
Marital Status	-.09	.32	.08	.91
(1 = married, 0 = unmarried)				
Has Children	.49	.38	1.62	1.63
(1 = yes, 0 = no)				
Born in Israel	.11	.32	.11	1.11
(1 = yes, 0 = no)				
Former USSR Immigrant	-1.02	.38	7.33	.36**
(1 = yes, 0 = no)				
Constant	.38	.85	.20	1.46

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Predicting Support for Peace by Acknowledgment of the Occupation and Sociodemographic Variables

To test our hypothesis that acknowledging the occupation would predict support for peace beyond other sociodemographic predictors, we conducted a linear regression analysis in which support for peace was the criterion. The sociodemographic predictors were entered simultaneously in the first step and accounted for 28% of the variance in support for peace ($p < .001$). In the second step, acknowledgment of the occupation was added as a predictor (see Table 2). Consistent with our hypothesis, acknowledgment of the occupation significantly predicted support for peace even after controlling for sociodemographic variables and adding it to the model increased the percentage of variance explained to 33%.

STUDY 1b

In Study 1b, we added questions to the NSSC survey in order to replicate the findings of Study 1a in a more systematic manner. This study examined the relationship between acknowledgment of the occupation and support for a peace agreement involving specific compromises aimed at ending the

Table 2. Regression Analysis Predicting Support for Peace by Acknowledgment of the Occupation and Sociodemographic Variables (Study 1a)

	B	SE	β	T
Acknowledgment of the Occupation	2.06	.40	.25	5.14**
Gender (1 = male, 0 = female)	.20	.37	.03	.54
Age	.01	.01	.04	.71
Education				
Partial high school	-1.53	1.13	-.10	-1.35
High school	-1.24	.96	-.15	-1.30
Post high school	-.38	1.07	-.03	-.36
Academic	-1.08	1.02	-.12	-1.06
Voting in Last Elections				
Labor	2.32	.66	.20	3.51**
Likud	.02	.53	.003	.05
Shas	-1.11	1.29	-.05	-.86
Meretz	3.62	.98	.19	3.70**
Mafdal	-1.10	1.23	-.05	-.89
Yahadut Hatorah	-2.68	1.45	-.13	-1.84
Am Echad	-2.05	3.55	-.03	-.58
Shinuy	1.05	.71	.08	1.47
HaIchud HaLeumi	-.42	1.18	-.02	-.36
Israel BaAliya	-1.19	1.88	-.03	-.63
Other	1.29	1.50	.04	.86
Religiosity				
Traditional	.03	.45	.003	.06
Religious	-1.40	.77	-.10	-1.82
Orthodox	-.24	1.20	-.01	-.20
Household Income	.29	.15	.10	1.91
Marital Status	.05	.48	.01	.11
(1 = married, 0 = unmarried)				
Has Children	.70	.57	.07	1.23
(1 = yes, 0 = no)				
Born in Israel	.15	.48	.02	.32
(1 = yes, 0 = no)				
Former USSR Immigrant (1 = yes, 0 = no)	-.61	.59	-.06	-1.03

** $p < .01$

occupation. We hypothesized that acknowledgment of the occupation would predict support for peace beyond the effect of sociodemographic predictors.

Sample

The sample included 716 respondents (333 men, 383 women) representing the adult Jewish population residing within the 1967 borders of Israel. The mean age was 45.9 ($SD = 16.49$). Forty-two percent had college education, 24% had some other post-high-school education, 29% completed high school, and 4% had less than high-school education.⁴ Regarding religiosity, 50% defined themselves secular, 25% considered themselves traditional, 11% considered themselves religious, and 14% considered themselves orthodox religious. Politically, 22% reported voting for parties on the political right (e.g., Likud) in the last elections, 23% reported voting for parties in the political center (e.g., Kadima), 15% reported voting for parties on the political left (e.g., Labor), 11% reported voting for

⁴ Compared to the adult Jewish population of Israel, the sample is slightly biased toward the highly educated (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2007).

ultra-Orthodox parties, 2% reported voting for other parties, and 27% reported not voting or refused to respond.

Procedure

The respondents were interviewed by telephone during three weeks in April 2007. To obtain a representative sample, we used random sampling within stratified subgroups. Interviews were conducted by an experienced computerized survey institute in the interviewees' native language of Hebrew or Russian. The overall response rate was 44%, and the cooperation rate was 50%.

Measures

Support for Peace

One item was used to assess respondents' support for a peace agreement including specific compromises: "What is your opinion about a peace agreement with the Palestinians involving Israeli withdrawal to 1967 borders with some revisions?" (1 = strongly oppose, 6 = strongly support).

Acknowledgment of the Occupation

Acknowledgment of the occupation was assessed using one item as follows: "Some people argue that Israeli domination over the West Bank constitutes an occupation. To what extent do you agree or disagree with this claim?" (1 = not at all, 6 = very much).

Sociodemographic Variables

The following sociodemographic variables were included in the analysis: gender, age, marital status, having children, education level, religiosity, immigration from the former USSR, household income relative to national average, and voting in the last elections.

Results

Acknowledging the Occupation

In 2007, 27% of the respondents agreed to some extent (ratings between 4 and 6) with the statement that Israel's control of the West Bank constituted an occupation, while 72% did not agree (ratings between 1 and 3). Two percent did not respond. The complete distribution of responses can be found in Appendix S2 of the online supporting information.

Predicting Acknowledgment of the Occupation

Spearman's correlations among all Study 1b variables are presented in Appendix S4 of the online supporting information. Similar to Study 1, acknowledgment of the occupation was strongly and positively correlated with leftist voting ($r = .48, p < .001$) and positively but less strongly correlated with household income ($r = .15, p < .001$). It was also positively and weakly correlated with being born in Israel ($r = .09, p = .020$) and with age ($r = .07, p = .050$) and negatively correlated with religiosity ($r = -.28, p < .001$) and with being an immigrant from the former USSR ($r = -.19, p < .001$). To test which sociodemographic variables predicted acknowledging the occupation beyond others, we conducted an ordinal regression with acknowledgment of the occupation as a criterion all the sociodemographic variables as predictors (entered simultaneously). The results are presented in Table 3. The overall regression model was significant (Cox and Snell pseudo- $R^2 = .25, \chi^2(26) = 183.15, p < .001$). After controlling for all sociodemographic variables, acknowledgment of the occupation was positively related to voting for the leftist parties Labor and Meretz and the centrist party Gimlaim and to being secular or traditional. It was negatively related to voting for the rightist parties Likud and Israel Beiteinu, to household income somewhat above average or lower, and to being an immigrant from the former USSR. In addition, the effect of gender reached significance when controlling for all other sociodemographic variables, but given that the zero-order correlation was very weak and nonsignificant ($r = .01$), we are cautious about interpreting this effect.

Table 3. Ordinal Regression Predicting Acknowledgment of the Occupation by Sociodemographic Variables (Study 1b)

	Estimate	SE	Wald
Age	.01	.01	1.99
Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	−.38	.17	5.10*
Education			
Elementary	.03	.44	.003
High school	.07	.20	.12
Post high school	−.40	.22	3.45
Voting in Last Elections			
Kadima	.04	.23	.03
Labor	.86	.27	10.01**
Likud	−.73	.34	4.62*
Shas	.50	.50	1.02
Israel Beiteinu	−1.02	.39	6.86**
Mafdal + HaIchud HaLeumi	−.42	.51	.68
Gimlaim	1.13	.43	6.98**
Yahadut Hatorah	.15	.51	.09
Meretz	2.15	.51	17.83**
Other	.18	.62	.08
Religiosity			
Secular	1.62	.44	13.80**
Traditional	1.03	.44	5.56*
Religious	.43	.47	.84
Household Income			
Much below average	−.97	.31	9.73**
A little below average	−.61	.31	3.84*
Same as average	−.66	.29	5.22*
A little above average	−.66	.28	5.63*
Marital Status (1 = married, 2 = unmarried)	−.03	.23	.02
Has Children (1 = yes, 2 = no)	−.10	.30	.11
Born in Israel (1 = yes, 2 = no)	−.11	.21	.26
Former USSR Immigrant (1 = yes, 2 = no)	−.91	.28	10.32**

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

Predicting Support for Peace by Acknowledgment of the Occupation and Sociodemographic Variables

To replicate Study 1 and support our hypothesis that acknowledging the occupation would predict support for peace beyond sociodemographic predictors, we conducted an ordinal regression in which support for peace was the criterion. In the first step, the sociodemographic predictors were entered simultaneously and yielded a significant model (Cox and Snell pseudo- $R^2 = .34$, $\chi^2(26) = 246.67$, $p < .001$). In the second step, acknowledgment of the occupation was added as a predictor (see Table 4). The model remained significant (Cox and Snell pseudo- $R^2 = .38$, $\chi^2(31) = 298.80$, $p < .001$), and consistent with our hypothesis and with the findings of Study 1a; low acknowledgment (i.e., denial) of the occupation (ratings of 1 or 2) was significantly and negatively related to support for peace.

STUDY 2

In this study, initiated by the authors, we examined the psychological mechanism behind the negative association observed in Studies 1a and 1b between denial of the occupation and support for peace and compromises aimed at ending the occupation. In addition to measuring acknowledgment of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank, support for compromises and other relevant sociodemographic variables, we measured recognition of negative consequences of the occupation for Israel,

Table 4. Ordinal Regression Predicting support for Peace by Acknowledgment of the Occupation and Sociodemographic Variables (Study 1b)

	Estimate	SE	Wald
Age	.01	.01	2.93
Gender (1 = male, 2 = female)	−.07	.17	.16
Education			
Elementary	.06	.44	.02
High school	−.27	.21	1.66
Post high school	−.23	.21	1.18
Voting in Last Elections			
Kadima	.71	.23	9.10**
Labor	.95	.29	10.94**
Likud	−.49	.34	2.12
Shas	−.77	.64	1.45
Israel Beiteinu	−.54	.37	2.12
Mafdal + Halchud HaLeumi	−.03	.48	.01
Gimlaim	.55	.44	1.52
Yahadut Hatorah	.53	.49	1.15
Meretz	1.65	.55	8.97**
Other	.49	.62	.63
Religiosity			
Secular	1.70	.45	14.24**
Traditional	.96	.45	4.50*
Religious	.33	.49	.44
Household Income			
Much below average	−.86	.32	7.29**
A little below average	−.46	.32	2.11
Same as average	−.43	.29	2.09
A little above average	−.45	.29	2.48
Marital Status (1 = married, 2 = unmarried)	.11	.24	.23
Has Children (1 = yes, 2 = no)	−.001	.31	<.001
Born in Israel (1 = yes, 2 = no)	−.40	.21	3.52
Former USSR Immigrant (1 = yes, 2 = no)	−1.53	.29	27.70
Acknowledgment of the Occupation			
1	−1.34	.27	24.34**
2	−1.26	.35	12.81**
3	−.55	.32	3.02
4	−.61	.35	3.09
5	−.28	.36	.61

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

moral emotions regarding Israel's actions toward the Palestinians, and openness to information about the Palestinian perspective. We hypothesized that denying the costs of the occupation to Israel, low levels of moral emotions, and reduced openness to information about the Palestinian perspective will mediate the relationship between denial of occupation and rejecting compromises aimed at ending it.

Sample

The sample included 503 adult Jewish Israelis (244 men, 259 women). The mean age was 42.54 ($SD = 15.33$). Thirty-six percent had at least college education, 37% had some other post-high-school education, 20% completed high school, and 7% had less than high-school education.⁵ Regarding religiosity, 55% defined themselves as secular, 24% considered themselves traditional, 12% considered

⁵ Compared to the adult Jewish population of Israel, the sample is somewhat biased toward the young and highly educated (Central Bureau of Statistics, 2016).

themselves religious, and 9% considered themselves Orthodox religious. Politically, 31% reported voting for parties on the political right (e.g., Likud) in the last elections, 18% reported voting for parties in the political center (e.g., Yesh Atid), 22% reported voting for parties on the political left (e.g., HaMahane HaZioni), 8% reported voting for ultra-Orthodox parties, 3% reported voting for other parties, and 18% reported not voting or refused to respond.

Procedure

The respondents were recruited online by an Internet surveying company in September 2016 and agreed to participate in exchange for approximately US\$1.3. Random sampling within stratified subgroups was used to obtain a representative sample of Israeli Jews.

Measures

Support for Compromises

We used three items ($\alpha = .81$) to assess participants' support (1 = strongly oppose; 6 = strongly support) for specific compromises as part of a peace agreement with the Palestinians (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). The complete wording of the items can be found in Appendix S1 of the online supporting information.

Acknowledgment of the Occupation

Acknowledgment of the occupation was assessed using one item as follows: "In your opinion, is it correct or incorrect to define Israel's control of the territories of Judea and Samaria as an occupation?" (1 = certainly correct; 4 = certainly incorrect).

Recognition of Negative Consequences of the Occupation for Israel

Respondents rated the extent to which Israel's control over the Palestinians in the territories of Judea and Samaria was harmful to Israel (1 = not at all; 4 = very much) in seven domains ($\alpha = .90$). The complete wording of the items can be found in Appendix S1 of the online supporting information.

Moral Emotions Regarding Israel's Actions Toward the Palestinians

Respondents rated the extent to which they felt guilt and shame ($r = .82, p < .001$) regarding Israel's actions toward the Palestinians (1 = not at all; 6 = very much).

Openness to Information about the Palestinian Perspective

Three items ($\alpha = .89$) assessed respondents' willingness (1 = not at all; 6 = very much) to be exposed to information regarding the Palestinians' perspective on the conflict (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011). The complete wording of the items can be found in Appendix S1 of the online supporting information.

Sociodemographic Variables

The following sociodemographic variables were included in the analysis: gender, age, marital status, having children, education level, religiosity, being born in Israel, immigration from the former USSR, household income relative to the national average, and voting in the last elections.

Results

Acknowledging the Occupation

In 2016, 30% of the respondents were certain or thought that it was correct to define Israel's control of the territories of Judea and Samaria as an occupation, while 70% were certain or thought that this was incorrect. The complete distribution of responses can be found in Appendix S2.

Predicting Acknowledgment of the Occupation

Spearman's correlations among all Study 2 variables are presented in Appendix S5 of the online supporting information. Similar to Studies 1a and 1b, acknowledgment of the occupation was strongly

Table 5. Logistic Regression Predicting Acknowledgment of the Occupation by Sociodemographic Variables (Study 2)

	B	SE	Wald	Exp(B)
Gender (1 = male, 0 = female)	-.59	.26	4.99*	.56
Age	.04	.01	10.54**	1.04
Education				
11–12 years of school	-1.23	1.48	.70	.29
High school student	.45	1.96	.05	1.57
High school completed	-.58	1.30	.20	.56
Post high school student	-.86	1.51	.33	.42
Post high school completed	-.54	1.28	.18	.58
Undergraduate student	-.61	1.36	.20	.55
College education completed	-.35	1.30	.07	.70
Master's student	-.18	1.83	.01	.83
Master's degree completed	-.21	1.32	.02	.82
Ph.D. student	22.41	27967.92	<.001	>10 ¹⁰
Ph.D. completed	.02	1.55	<.001	1.02
Voting in Last Elections				
Likud	-1.42	.45	9.91**	.24
HaMachane HaZioni	.94	.39	5.73*	2.56
Joint Party	-20.39	40192.97	<.001	<.001
Yesh Atid	-.48	.43	1.24	.62
Kulanu	-.95	.61	2.40	.39
Habayit Hayehudi	-1.31	.73	3.18	.27
Shas	-19.02	12065.44	<.001	<.001
Yahadut Hatorah	.27	1.08	.06	1.31
Israel Beiteinu	-1.47	1.17	1.58	.23
Meretz	1.42	.67	4.45*	4.13
Other	-.11	.59	.04	.90
Religiosity				
Traditional	-.76	.33	5.33*	.47
Religious	-.95	.56	2.93	.39
Orthodox	-1.88	1.06	3.13	.15
Household Income	.14	.12	1.37	1.15
Marital Status	.34	.33	1.03	1.40
(1 = married, 0 = unmarried)				
Has Children (1 = yes, 0 = no)	-.78	.38	4.10*	.46
Born in Israel (1 = yes, 0 = no)	-.35	.41	.73	.70
Former USSR Immigrant	-1.16	.71	2.65	.32
(1 = yes, 0 = no)				

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

and positively correlated with leftist voting ($r = .54, p < .001$). In addition, it was positively but less strongly correlated with age ($r = .26, p < .001$), education ($r = .22, p < .001$), and household income ($r = .10, p = .023$). Moreover, acknowledgment of the occupation was negatively related to religiosity ($r = -.36, p < .001$) and to being born in Israel ($r = -.10, p = .029$). Finally, women tended to acknowledge the occupation slightly more than men (33% of women acknowledged the occupation vs. 28% of men, $r = -.10, p = .031$).

To test which sociodemographic variables predicted as acknowledgment of the occupation beyond others, we first recoded the responses into a dichotomous variable (1 = certain or think that it is correct to define the situation as occupation; 0 = certain or think that it is incorrect). Then we conducted logistic regression with this variable as the criterion and the sociodemographic variables as predictors (entered simultaneously). Dummy variables were created for categorical predictors (see Table 5). After controlling for all sociodemographic variables, acknowledgment of the occupation was positively related to voting for the left-wing parties HaMachane HaZioni and Meretz and to age

and negatively related to voting for the major right-wing party Likud, to traditional religiosity, to having children, and to being male.

Predicting Support for Compromises by Acknowledgment of the Occupation and Sociodemographic Variables

As in Studies 1a and 1b, we were interested in whether acknowledgment of the occupation would predict support for compromises beyond the effect of the sociodemographic variables. For this purpose, we conducted a linear regression analysis in which support for compromises was the criterion. The sociodemographic predictors were entered simultaneously in the first step and accounted for 48% of the variance in support for compromises ($p < .001$). In the second step, acknowledgment of the occupation was added as a predictor (see Table 6). Consistent with our hypothesis, acknowledgment of the occupation significantly predicted support for compromises even after controlling for sociodemographic variables and adding it to the model increased the percentage of variance explained to 54%.

Mediators of the Relationship Between Acknowledgment of the Occupation and Support for Compromises

Our hypotheses state that three factors may explain the relationship between acknowledgment of the occupation and support for compromises: recognition of the negative consequences of the occupation for Israel, moral emotions regarding Israel's actions toward the Palestinians, and openness to information on the Palestinian perspective on the conflict. In order to test the indirect effect of acknowledgment of the occupation on support for compromises through the hypothesized mediators, we used Hayes' (2013) PROCESS macro model 4 with the sociodemographic variables entered as covariates, $R^2 = .64$, $F(36,447) = 21.59$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 1). The results revealed that acknowledgment of the occupation significantly predicted recognition of the negative consequences for Israel ($B = .44$, $SE = .07$, $t = 6.09$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = [.29, .58]), moral emotions ($B = .65$, $SE = .13$, $t = 5.15$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = [.40, .90]) and openness to information about the Palestinian perspective ($B = .45$, $SE = .15$, $t = 2.91$, $p = .004$, 95% CI = [.15, .75]). The three mediators, in turn, significantly predicted support for compromises (negative consequences: $B = .21$, $SE = .07$, $t = 2.88$, $p = .004$, 95% CI = [.07, .35]; moral emotions: $B = .28$, $SE = .04$, $t = 4.67$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = [.20, .36]; openness to information: $B = .17$, $SE = .03$, $t = 5.00$, $p = .004$, 95% CI = [.10, .24]). Moreover, the indirect effects of acknowledgment of the occupation on support for compromises through all three mediators were significant (through negative consequences: $B = .09$, $SE = .04$, 95% CI = [.03, .17]; through moral emotions: $B = .18$, $SE = .05$, 95% CI = [.09, .31]; through openness to information: $B = .08$, $SE = .04$, 95% CI = [.02, .16]). There was also a significant direct effect of acknowledgment of the occupation on support for compromises ($B = .53$, $SE = .11$, $t = 4.67$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = [.30, .75]), but this effect was reduced compared to a model that did not control for the mediators ($B = .88$, $SE = .12$, $t = 7.34$, $p < .001$, 95% CI = [.64, 1.11]).

General Discussion

Beyond harsh implications for the occupied society, prolonged occupation usually comes with heavy material costs for the occupying society, as well as unfavorable consequences for its collective identity (Bar-Tal & Schnell, 2013b; Bornstein, 2008; Rosler et al., 2009). Previous studies suggested that societies tend to morally disengage from their past or currently unacceptable wrongdoing (Bandura, 1999; Coman et al., 2014) thus minimizing its perceived negative consequences (Leidner et al., 2010) and reducing moral emotions (Lickel et al., 2011; Wohl & Branscombe, 2008). However, to cope with the challenges of an ongoing occupation, the occupying society also constructs a system of sociopsychological coping mechanisms, including denial of the occupation and various justifications

Table 6. Regression Analysis Predicting Support for Compromises by Acknowledgment of the Occupation and Sociodemographic Variables (Study 2)

	B	SE	Beta	t
Acknowledging the Occupation (1 = yes, 0 = no)	.88	.12	.29	7.34**
Gender (1 = male, 0 = female)	.15	.10	.05	1.54
Age	.01	.004	.06	1.17
Education				
11–12 years of school	–.02	.53	–.004	–.04
High school student	1.92	.87	.09	2.22*
High school completed	.06	.51	.02	.11
Post high school student	–.18	.56	–.02	–.31
Post high school completed	.15	.51	.05	.30
Undergraduate student	–.14	.53	–.03	–.26
College education completed	.20	.51	.06	.39
Master's student	.59	.68	.04	.87
Master's degree completed	.27	.52	.06	.52
Ph.D. student	1.55	.87	.07	1.78
Ph.D. completed	–.10	.62	–.01	–.16
Voting in Last Elections				
Likud	–.58	.16	–.16	–3.63**
HaMachane HaZioni	.67	.17	.18	3.90**
Joint Party	.54	1.01	.02	.54
Yesh Atid	.43	.18	.10	2.41*
Kulanu	.04	.23	.01	.17
Habayit Hayehudi	–.48	.22	–.09	–2.21*
Shas	–.20	.36	–.02	–.55
Yahadut Hatorah	–.30	.29	–.05	–1.02
Israel Beiteinu	–.19	.36	–.02	–.53
Meretz	1.44	.25	.22	5.68**
Other	–.45	.24	–.07	–1.91
Religiosity				
Traditional	–.32	.12	–.10	–2.61**
Religious	–.58	.18	–.13	–3.26**
Orthodox	–.47	.26	–.10	–1.79
Household Income	.03	.05	.03	.72
Marital Status (1 = married, 0 = unmarried)	.13	.13	.05	1.05
Has Children (1 = yes, 0 = no)	–.25	.15	–.09	–1.73
Born in Israel (1 = yes, 0 = no)	–.05	.16	–.01	–.30
Former USSR Immigrant (1 = yes, 0 = no)	–.13	.25	–.02	–.54

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$

for its continuation (Halperin et al. 2010). We suggest that such denial creates a strong barrier to peaceful conflict resolution by ending the occupation.

We used three polls with nationwide samples of Jewish Israelis in the context of the prolonged Israeli occupation, which is at the heart of the intractable Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In Studies 1a and 1b, we found, in keeping with our hypothesis, that denying the occupation predicted reduced support for the peace process as well as opposition to specific compromises beyond all the sociodemographic predictors. Study 2 not only further substantiated our hypotheses, but it also revealed the mechanism through which denial of the occupation operates as a barrier to conflict resolution. We found that the denial of the occupation was associated with denial of its costs, with lower levels of moral emotion, and with closure to new information about alternative perspectives on the conflict. These variables, in turn, were associated with rejection of compromises aimed at resolving the conflict peacefully and




Figure 1. Mediation of the relationship between acknowledgment of the occupation and support for compromises by recognition of negative consequences, moral emotions and openness to information about the Palestinian perspective. Socio-demographic variables were included in the model as covariates. Their effects are omitted for simplicity but can be found in Appendix S6 of the online supporting information. * $p < .01$; ** $p < .001$.

mediated the relationship between denial of the occupation and conflict-related attitudes. Together, the findings support our hypotheses, demonstrating that denial of an occupation serves as a barrier to conflict resolution at three different points in time.

Interestingly, our findings reveal that Israeli Jews’ willingness to acknowledge that the Israeli control over the West Bank is an occupation has dramatically declined from 51% in 2004, to 27% in 2007 and 30% in 2016. This decline is possibly a result of the prolonged term of the rightist government that propagates exclusive Jewish ownership of the West Bank (Magal et al., 2013). Also, Israel decided in 1972 to erase from the maps the green line that separates the West Bank from the state of Israel, and as a result generations grow up not knowing that the West Bank is a different political entity (Adwan, Bar-Tal, & Wexler, 2016). Furthermore, the change can demonstrate the potential power over public opinion of leaders’ framing of the occupation reality in their political rhetoric. Ariel Sharon, who served as Israeli Prime Minister from 2001 until early 2006, framed the situation in the West Bank as occupation in his public rhetoric (Aronoff, 2014; Magal et al., 2013), saying that “It is impossible to hold 3.5 million Palestinians under occupation” and that “the occupation cannot last indefinitely” (Likud party meeting at the Knesset, May 26, 2003). However, Benjamin Netanyahu, Israel’s Prime Minister since 2009, rejected this perception (Aronoff, 2014; Rosler, Bar-Tal, & Hagag, 2016), framing the situation in the West Bank (Judea and Samaria) differently: “In Judea and Samaria, the Jewish people are not foreign occupiers. We are not the British in India. We are not the Belgians in the Congo. This is the land of our forefathers” (Joint Meeting of the U.S. Congress, May 24, 2011). This emphasizes the importance of understanding the implications of denying an occupation, since this perception becomes widespread and part of the political mainstream among the occupying society, which is responsible for maintenance or peaceful termination of the occupation (Magal et al., 2013).

Theoretical Implications

Our findings hold theoretical significance for the growing research field of sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution. Previous research has focused on cognitive biases (Maoz, Ward, Katz, & Ross, 2002), negative emotions (Halperin, 2011), general worldviews and societal beliefs pertaining to the conflict, to the other side, and to one’s ingroup (Halperin & Bar-Tal, 2011; Porat et al., 2015) as barriers. The present research applies the concept of barriers to difficult cases in which the conflict involves prolonged occupation. It elaborates on the nature of societal beliefs among the occupying society justifying the occupation or denying the situation as such, associated with lower levels of support for its peaceful termination. It shows that when society members set their mind to denying the occupation as a result of political socialization through leaders’ messages, political discourse, and

educational processes, they then have great difficulty parting from the occupying territory. Societies do not easily leave land they consider to be their homeland.

Of special importance are the findings of the second study because they demonstrate the process of justifying the reluctance to resolve the conflict peacefully. Individuals who deny the reality of the occupation also deny its costs, disengage emotionally from guilt feeling, and refuse to be open to new information. In other words, they use cognitive-emotional mechanisms to feel consonant with their view of the situation.

Furthermore, our findings indicate the important contribution of acknowledging an occupation by the occupying society to the advancement of peace. This perception is associated with acknowledging the costs of an occupation, experiencing moral emotions, openness to new information about the conflict, belief in the feasibility of peace, support for previous interim political settlements, for concrete future peace plans, and for negotiating with the opponent, even when controlling for political preferences.

Applied Implications

In addition to theoretical implications, our findings suggest practical applications for overcoming sociopsychological barriers to conflict resolution (Gayer, Landman, Halperin, & Bar-Tal, 2009; Hameiri, Bar-Tal, & Halperin, 2014). This begins with a cognitive change of *unfreezing* (Lewin, 1947; Marcus, 2014), when a new idea or *an instigating belief* (Bar-Tal & Halperin, 2009), inconsistent with previously held attitudes stimulates reevaluation of current positions and may lead to searching for alternatives. Previous studies have shown that providing information that contradicts current beliefs, such as possible future losses if the conflict persists (Gayer et al., 2009) or new general information about the malleability of groups (Halperin et al., 2011) or conflicts (Cohen-Chen, Halperin, Crisp, & Gross, 2014), can create greater support for compromises and for peace. One question remaining is how to adapt interventions for overcoming sociopsychological barriers to the particular context of occupation. Our findings suggest that in the context of prolonged occupation, providing information that instigates and facilitates changes of views and then reframing the situation as an occupation may assist in overcoming these barriers and promoting peaceful resolution of the conflict. At present, occupation has negative connotations, and it normally arouses a will to terminate it. Obviously, this does not always occur because societies may acknowledge occupation but find a serious rationale to maintain it. Nonetheless, acknowledging an occupation is progress towards changing views—a substantial portion of Israeli Jews is not even there.

Presenting conflict resolution as ending an occupation—rather than as concessions or withdrawal from homeland territories—can promote positive framing of the process as cutting psychological, economic, and political losses (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Mintz & Geva, 1998). Examples of such use can be found in the acknowledgment of the Israeli occupation by former Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon (Magal et al., 2013), and in the repeated use and emphasis that dovish political groups in Israel put on the term “occupation” in their persuasive messages for promoting a comprehensive peaceful settlement of the conflict (Rosler, 2013).

Limitations and Future Directions

The current research focused on the Israeli occupation of the West Bank. One limitation is our focus on one case study, hence leaving unknown whether these findings will generalize to other conflicts. A second important limitation is the studies’ correlational designs, which do not allow causal inferences. One interesting direction for future studies is testing the hypotheses using experimental methods. Another important future direction is trying to differentiate the impact of ideological versus pragmatic justifications for prolonged occupation on attitudes as well as potential strategies to advance conflict resolution.

We believe that conflicts that begin in the mind of society members can also end with the change of their mind. The current research can potentially contribute to such change by providing insights into the political effects of sociopsychological barriers in prolonged occupation. Reframing the situation and again facing the undesirable consequences of occupation may create an initial yet important step towards peace.

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SUPPORTING INFORMATION

Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this article at the publisher's website:

Appendix S1: Measurements

Appendix S2: Distribution of Responses to Questions Regarding Acknowledgment of the Occupation

Appendix S3: Spearman's Correlations Among Study 1a Variables

Appendix S4: Spearman's Correlations Among Study 1b Variables

Appendix S5: Spearman's Correlations Among Study 2 Variables

Appendix S6: Complete Information About PROCESS Analysis